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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintili /Appellee,

:

v.

:

LAURA RUTH MILLER,

:

Case No. 940390-CA

Priority No, 2

Defend a nt ' Appe11an L, i
BRIEF

-. AiP£: LEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE „b PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for unlawful
production of a controlled substance (marijuana)
felony, in violation of utdii t «nie Ann

-- ; :

K nn r/ • 8

7

degree

) va; \±} (1994);

possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), =a ^l^pcs p
misdemeanor , in violation of Utah Code Ann , § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i)
1994; and possession of paraphernal 1 a

,n r:Iass R misdemeanor, in

violation of Utah Code Ann. § 5 8-37a-5 (1994) .
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 ?^ ff^

).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1,

mid t lie trial court correctly rule that under the

totality of the circumstances the search warrant affidavit
established probable cause for * ;;-- issuance of a search warrant.
When a .search wa > - it ±t> challenged as having been
issued without probable cause, the reviewing court ..*oes n
conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's determination ~£
probable cause; rathei ( i«> uphold the warrant, the reviewing
court must simply conclude that the magistrate had a

11

'substantial basis'" for determining that probable cause

existed.

State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1993)

(quoting State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989)); State
v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah App, 1988), cert, denied, 773
P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).

In conducting its examination, the

reviewing court "should consider a search warrant affidavit 'in
its entirety and in a common-sense fashion.'"

Id.; Salt Lake

City v. Truiillo, 854 P.2d 603, 606 (Utah App. 1993).

In short,

the reviewing court pays great deference to the magistrate's
decision.

Truiillo, 854 P.2d at 606 (citing Babbell, 770 P.2d at

991) .
2.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's

motion for mistrial?
"On appeal from a denial of a motion for mistrial based
on prosecutorial misconduct, because the trial court is in the
best position to determine an alleged error's impact on the
proceedings, [the reviewing court] will not reverse the trial
court's ruling absent an abuse of discretion."

State v. Hay, 859

P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const. Amend IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with two drug related offenses
under Utah Code Ann. § 5837-8(1

) (1994) including:

unlawful

production of marijuana, a third degree felony and possession of
marijuana, a class B misdemeanor
charged with possession

Additionally, defendant was

• '

-•-^ a misdemeanor,

* -

in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-

•*--*

(

R.

1) .

Defendant filed a motion to suppress contraband seized
during a warrant-supported seaicli of JIM l"«i»in*:' an<l surrounding
property in alleged violation of the state and federal
constitutions (R. 38).
After conducting a suppression t.tairlnq
1994, the trial court denied defendant

-n Pphruan, 4,

, motion (R.

Thereafter , Ti Api I'I 26, 19!34, defendant was tried by a jury and
convicted as charged \k

153-55).

The trial court sentenced defendant tc zero to five
yeais ami assessed fines and tees for the ui., - • degree felony
conviction, and two six month terms for the
convictions, all terms to run concurrently.

-- .- •*=• • •
The trial court then

stayed defendant's- sentences at i placed her on a 36 month term of
probation (R. 171-72).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On U':tolier 1, M'M, Deputy Bill Pierce of the San Juan
County Sheriff's Department obtained a search wairant foi
property belonging to Robert Schultz, including a mobile home,
house, outbuild,.

~.
3

Addendum A.

The affidavit set forth information obtained from a confidential
informant implicating defendant, who was one of Schultz's
caretakers, in the production and use of controlled substances
(R. 50), see Addendum A.
1.

Personal Observations of Confidential Informant

As set out in Deputy Pierce's affidavit, the
confidential informant reported that defendant was using the
Schultz property "to cultivate marijuana," and that "marijuana
and other controlled substances [were] kept in the vehicles and
buildings on the property" (R. 50), see Addendum A.

The

informant also reported that "he ha[d] observed controlled
substances in possession of [defendant] over the last few months,
. . . in the structures . . . and in the vehicles she has access
to on the property."

Id.

Specifically, the confidential

informant reported that he had observed defendant "and two
unknown males from Moab," use "marijuana and 'crack' on the
property over the last few months."

Id.

In support of his assertions, the informant provided
photographs of the live marijuana plants. He also provided a
detailed description of where on the property, the marijuana was
being grown, "describ[ing] the position relative to the building
and trees" on the property (R. 50), see Addendum A.
2.

Independent Police Corroboration and Verification

Deputy Pierce stated that he found the information
reliable because he had personally known the informant "for two

4

years" and had found him "to be a reliable and truthful
individual" (R. 50), see Addendum A.
Additionally,

.

•

" "luitz property

from a public access road and found that

matched the

description provided by the informant

•

see Addendum A.

Specifically, the deputy was able to

:'-;.-...^.-. oly verify where

on the property the.marijuana was being cultivated, noting the
"tal

:..

in the vicinity as described by the informant and

depicted :*
3*

.< photographs,

Id.

Seizure of Evidence

Upon -.•:••••- o *

the search warrant, police seized one

large marijuana plant a.: another metal pi ant container fi om the
grounds surrounding defendant's house
seizee :

Additionally, police

canisters containing marijuana, one from a

vehicle . : the property and another from defendant's bedroom.
Finally, . H ..co discovered a baggy of marijuana and two pipes in
the livingroom/kitchen area of defendant's living quarters (R.
48), see Addendum A.
4•

Motion to Suppress

Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from
her residence, broadly alleging that the search warrant affid* I
contained material misrepresentations and omitted material
information and tl i i is failed to adequately establish the
confidential informant's reliability (R

3 8 (motion); K

Hi, 4 3

(supporting memorandum)) (copies are attached as Addendum B ) .

5

5.

Denial of Motion to Suppress

The trial court denied defendant's motion on March 9,
1994 and made the following factual findings:
1. The Court finds that the search was
conducted pursuant to a warrant and that the
[d]efendant has the burden of going forward
and showing that the warrant was deficient.
2. Having heard all of the witnesses in this
case the Court finds that the information
given to the [o]fficer . . . was:
a. That the confidential informant lived at
the residence immediately before the
information was given.
b. That the [o]fficer had in his possession
pictures of what he believed to be
[m]arijuana plants described as being located
on the property.
c. That the informant had been a caretaker
of this property and was allowed to remain on
the properties even after difficulties had
arisen with other persons who had lived or
been trusted there.
d. That the description of the premises
given by the informant was borne out through
independent investigation by the [o]fficer.
e. That the [o]fficer viewed the properties
at the location where the informant had said
the plants were being cultivated from a
public access and verified that the
description was similar to what had been
expressed to him earlier.
3. The Court finds that the seeming
inconsistency in the search warrant with
regard to the amount of time that the
[o]fficer had known the confidential
informant was apparently in error based upon
testimony, but that this error was not
reckless and was not material and did not
change the sufficiency in the warrant.
4. The Court finds that no other part of the
warrant was reckless and that information
6

with regard to the confidential informant
relationship to the people on the property
and possible motive was not borne out by the
evidence and was not of a substantial enough
nature to change the sufficiency of the
warrant and was not required to be expressed
in the warrant to make the warrant
sufficient,
5. The Court finds that after these supposed
incidents occurred which bias the
confidential informant, that the owner of the
property retained him as a care taker [sic]
of the property.
The Court further finds upon hearing the
testimony of the owner of the property and
the defendant that their testimony was not as
reliable as evidence placed into the record
by the [o]fficer.
7. The Court finds that warrant [sic] was
sufficient, that the information express[ed]
in the warrant provided probable cause to
believe that marijuana plants may have been
cultivated on the property at the time in
question. That this was sufficiently set
forth by the warrant and that the warrant
was sufficient.
(R. 56-58) (a complete copy is attached as Addendum C).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Considering the t^rialitv of • : •

. ..

Pierce's affidavit set forth a substantial basis of information
from whiiMli the magistrate properly determined there was probable
cause to search defendant's residence and sun ounding property.
Specifically, the affidavit contained the personal observations
of a confi dent a al informant who reported seeing defendant both
use and cultivate controlled substances,

The informant provided

insider details and even took pictures of the marijuana being
cultiv ated

Using1 the i iIformant' s description of the property
7

and the photographs, the deputy was able to determine
approximately where on the property the marijuana was being
cultivated and to otherwise visually verify the informant's
information.
The trial court rejected defendant's allegations of
reckless misrepresentation in the affidavit on the ground that
the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause, even
setting aside the "seeming inconsistency," regarding the precise
length of time Deputy Pierce had known the informant.

Moreover,

the trial court found that defendant's allegations of material
omissions in the affidavit were either unsubstantiated and/or
irrelevant and therefore not necessary to be set forth therein.
On appeal defendant has not properly challenged the court's
findings as clearly erroneous.

She has neither marshalled the

evidence, nor shown how it is insufficient.

This Court must

therefore reject defendant's challenge and instead assume the
correctness of the trial court's findings.

State v. Larsen, 828

P.2d 487, 490 (Utah App. 1992), cert, granted, 836 P.2d 1383
(Utah 1992), aff'd, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993).
Defendant's allegation of prejudicial error concerning
the prosecutor's inadvertent retention of a defense exhibit
during jury deliberations must be rejected as invited error.
Defendant was made aware of the problem prior to the trial
court's taking of the jury verdict, yet defendant failed to bring
the matter to the court's attention until after the jury was
excused.

The trial court expressly noted defendant's failure to
8

timely raise the issue and accordingly denied defendant's motion
for mistrial.

Defendant's handling of the matter lead the court

into error and precluded the fashioning of a remedy for the
alleged prejudice.

Under this circumstance, the invited error

doctrine prohibits defendant from taking advantage of the error
on appeal.

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993).

Notwithstanding, the trial court made an alternative
finding that defendant was not unfairly prejudiced by the fact
that her exhibit did not go to the jury room during
deliberations.

Once again, defendant has not properly challenged

the trial court's findings as clearly erroneous.

She has neither

marshalled the evidence, nor shown how it is insufficient.
Consequently, this Court must reject defendant's allegation of
unfair prejudice and assume the correctness of the trial court's
findings to the contrary.

Larsen, 828 P.2d at 490.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS
FOR THE MAGISTRATE'S PROBABLE CAUSE
DETERMINATION
In Points I-II of her brief, defendant challenges the
adequacy of the search warrant affidavit to establish the
reliability of the confidential informant's allegations against
her.

Br. of App. at 12-20.

In particular, defendant asserts

that there was inadequate corroboration of the informant's
statements, and that alleged material omissions and
misrepresentations concerning the informant were reckless and
9

defeated the magistrate's determination of probable cause.

Id.

Defendant's allegations are not supported by a review of the
affidavit and the trial court's findings below.
A.

Informant Reliability

An informant's veracity, reliability and basis of
knowledge are factors to be considered in determining whether,
under the totality pf the circumstances, probable cause exists.
State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992).
11

However,

[t] hey are not strict, independent requirements to be 'rigidly

extracted' in every case."

State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130

(Utah 1987) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230
(1983)).

Rather, their significance varies under the

circumstances of each case.

Purser, 828 P.2d at 517 (citing

State v. Bailev, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984)).

For example,

"if the circumstances as a whole demonstrate the truthfulness of
the informant's report, a less strong showing is required."
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517.
In the present case, defendant complains that police
had not previously used the informant and broadly asserts that
the affidavit fails to set forth any significant corroboration of
the informant's allegations.

Br. of App. at 16, 19-20.

While

indicating that an informant has previously provided truthful
information is an accepted method for establishing veracity,
State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985), it is not the

X0

only way.1

Indeed, " [c]ourts have also consistently approved

the issuance of search warrants where the informant's knowledge
is based on personal observation."

Purser, 828 P.2d at 517.

Additionally, this court has recognized that a search warrant is
properly issued when the informant's reliability is demonstrated
by the detail of his/her report, and/or by "independent
corroboration of the significant facts."

Id.

Applying the foregoing standards and considering the
totality of the circumstances, Deputy Pierce's affidavit is
adequate to establish the reliability of the confidential
informant in this case.
1.

Personal Observation

First, the informant's allegations were based on his
personal observations, which, as noted above, suggests that the
information given was reliable.

Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. The

informant reported that he had "observed controlled substances in
possession of [defendant] over the last few months, . . . in the
structures . . ., and in the vehicles she has access to on the
property" (R. 50), see Addendum A.

Further, the informant

reported that he had seen defendant and two men from Moab, Utah,
"use marijuana and %crack' on the property" (R. 50), see Addendum
A.
1

See United v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 581-582 (1971)
(upholding search warrant affidavit based on information gleaned
from a first time informant; "this Court [has] never suggested
that an averment of previous reliability was necessary"). Accord
State v. Germane 559 A.2d 1031, 1035 (R.I. 1989); Meiia v.
State, 761 S.W.2d 35, 39 (Tex. App. 1988); State v. Pavne, 271
N.W.2d 350, 351 (Neb. 1978).
11

2•

Insider Details

Second, the reliability of the informant is enhanced by
the insider nature of his information.

Gates, 462 U.S. at 245;

Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. Specifically, the informant's
statements describing the "structures" and "vehicles" on the
property, as well as his description of the "tall grass" grown in
proximity to the marijuana plants, suggests that the information
was obtained from someone who was both familiar with and welcome
on the Schultz property.

Most significant is the fact that the

informant provided the deputy with actual pictures of the
marijuana plants that defendant was cultivating.
3•

Independent Corroboration

Third, the deputy was able to independently verify the
informant's description of the Schultz property.

State v. Vigh,

871 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Utah App. 1994); Purser, 828 P.2d at 517.
Viewing the property from a public access road, and aided by the
informant's photographs of the marijuana plants and his
description of the property, the deputy was able to identify the
"tall grass" near where the marijuana was grown.
4.

Nothing Given in Exchange for Information

Finally, the informant received nothing in exchange for
his information.

As recognized by this Court, when a

confidential informant receives nothing in exchange for his/her
information, the magistrate properly assumes the information is
reliable.

Vigh, 871 P.2d at 1034. C|L Purser, 828 P.2d at 517

("reliability and veracity are generally assumed when the

12

informant is a citizen who receives nothing from the police in
exchange for the information").
B. Trial Court Found No Reckless Error And
No Material Omission
Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendant broadly
asserts that the affidavit fails to establish probable cause
because the deputy omitted certain alleged information about the
informant, including his motive, reputation, and potentiality as
a suspect in the case.

See Br. of App. at 16-17.

Defendant

further asserts that the affidavit recklessly misrepresented the
length of time Deputy Pierce had known the informant and the
informant's reliability.

Id.

Defendant's assertions are

contrary to the trial court's written findings and are also
improperly before the Court.
1.

Proceedings Below

Deputy Pierce was called as a defense witness during
the suppression hearing and was subjected to extensive
examination by defense counsel (Transcript of Suppression
Hearing, February 4, 1994, Tr. at 3-62) .2 Specifically, defense
counsel asked the deputy how long he had known the informant
prior to compiling the affidavit.

Deputy Pierce clarified that

he believed he had known the informant for two years, but that he
did not remember when they first met (Tr. 17-18).

The deputy

recalled only that the informant had worked for him briefly as a

2

The transcript has not been stamped with record page
numbers; therefore, citation to the transcript will be to the
internal page numbers.
13

caretaker in January 1993, and that he had known him for an
unspecified period of time prior, at least "parts of two years"
(Tr. 18-19, 50-51).
Defense counsel also queried Deputy Pierce concerning
the informant's possible motive and reputation in the community
(Tr. 24-33, 56-62).

Deputy Pierce clarified that there were no

criminal charges pending against the informant, nor did he have a
criminal record (Tr. 24-26, 29) . Further, the informant had
neither requested nor been offered a reward in the case (Tr. 33).
And, while the deputy was aware that defendant and other people
connected to the Schultz property had expressed reservations
about the informant,3 their concerns did not suggest to him that
the informant had fabricated the information about defendant (Tr.
46-47).
Based on the foregoing, the trial court characterized
the issue concerning the precise length of time the deputy had
known the informant as a "seeming inconsistency," and found that
the two year length of time in the affidavit was "apparently in
error . . . , but that [the] error was not reckless and was not
material and did not change the sufficiency in the warrant" (R.
57), see Addendum C.

As for defendant's contentions regarding

3

The confidential informant's identity was known by the
time of the suppression hearing and was apparently initially
revealed at the preliminary hearing (R. 35).
14

the alleged omission of material information, the trial court
found
that no other part of the warrant was
reckless and that information with regard to
the confidential informant relationship to
the people on the property and possible
motive was not borne out by the evidence and
was not of a substantial enough nature to
change the sufficiency of the warrant and was
not required to be expressed in the warrant
to make the warrant sufficient.
(R. 57) , see Addendum C.

The trial court further found that the

deputy's testimony concerning these matters was more credible
than that of defendant and Steve Schultz, the owner of the
property (R. 58) , see Addendum C.4
2.

Failure to Marshal

Defendant has not challenged the foregoing findings as
clearly erroneous.
1990).

State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah

Specifically, defendant has neither marshalled the

evidence in support of the trial court's findings, nor
demonstrated how it is insufficient.

Id.; State v. Drobel. 815

P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App.) ("An appellant raising issues of fact
on appeal must, under Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a), marshal all the
evidence supporting the trial court's findings, and then show
that evidence to be insufficient."), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383
(Utah 1991).

Accordingly, this Court must reject defendant's

allegation that the affidavit contained reckless

4

It is not clear from record whether defendant and
Schultz in fact testified at the suppression hearing; however,
affidavits from both defendant and Schultz are included in the
record on appeal (R. 31-37).

15

misrepresentations and/or omitted material information and must
instead assume the correctness of the trial court's findings to
the contrary.

State v. Larsen. 828 P.2d 487, 490 (Utah App.),

cert, granted, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), aff'd, 865 P.2d 1355
(Utah 1993) .
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S ALLEGATION OF ERROR CONCERNING
THE PROSECUTOR'S INADVERTENT POSSESSION OF A
DEFENSE EXHIBIT DURING JURY DELIBERATIONS
CONSTITUTES INVITED ERROR AND SHOULD BE
REJECTED ON THAT GROUND
In Point III of her brief, defendant complains about
the prosecutor's inadvertent possession of a defense exhibit
during jury deliberations.

Br, of App. at 20-25.

Because the

error was brought to defense counsel's attention prior to the
jury's excusal, his failure to timely request an appropriate
remedy from the trial court constitutes invited error.

State v.

Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d
1201, 1205 (Utah App. 1991).
A.

Trial Court's Express Waiver Findings

Following the jury verdict in this matter, defense
counsel requested to make a motion outside the presence of the
jury (Tr. 232) (pertinent transcript pages are attached as
Addendum D ) .

Once the jury had been excused, defense counsel

moved for a mistrial, alleging that a "key" defense exhibit did
not go into the jury (Tr. 234), see Addendum D.

The prosecutor

explained to the trial court that he had inadvertently put
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Defense Exhibit #15 with his "stuff" and that it " [did not] go
in the jury room" (Tr. 233) , see Addendum D.

However, the

prosecutor further informed the court that he brought the matter
to defense counsel's attention, "jusi as the jury was coming in."
Id.

Defense counsel agreed that the misplaced exhibit had been

shown to him "before the jury came back in[,]" and that he was
"sure" the prosecutor's action was "inadverten[t]" (Tr. 234), see
Addendum D.
In ruling on the motion, the trial court inquired why
neither party had brought the matter to his attention before he
asked for the jury verdict:
I could have sent that in with them and said
you didn't have the exhibits. Here, here's
an additional exhibit. We won't take your
verdict. You consider whether that affects
your verdict and then come back in. . . .
This is something that could easily have been
corrected simply by sending the jury back out
with that exhibit and there would have been
no question. I would not take their verdict
from them until they had considered whether
that would make a difference.
(R. 235), see Addendum D.

The Court then denied defendant's

motion on waiver grounds:
I find that the [d]efendant has not raised this in
timely fashion. She knew about it, admittedly shortly
before the verdict was received[,] but she knew about
it in time that this could have been raised in time to
correct it by sending the jury back before the verdict
was received.
5

Defense Exhibit #1 is an unsigned letter from the
confidential informant to the San Juan County Sheriff's
Department and was admitted into evidence (R. 152). Although a
copy of the exhibit is attached to defendant's brief as "Exhibit
3;" defendant has not requested that the original be made part of
the record on appeal.
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I do find that the [d]efendant was aware but
before [sic] the jury was brought into the
courtroom and certainly before the Court
received the verdict and had it read.
Certainly not before the jury had indicated
that they had reached a decision. But I can
send them back before they have announced the
decision and any fact, even afterwards I can
send them back saying, wait a minute, I think
there is something here that is a problem. I
think I could send them back even then to
reconsider their verdict in the light of
additional information.
(Tr. 236-37), see addendum D.
B.

Invited Error

Utah's appellate courts recognize the "invited error"
doctrine.

Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220; Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1205. The

doctrine has two principal purposes:

to fortify the "long-

established policy that the trial court should have the first
opportunity to address the claim of error [,]" and to
"discourage [] parties from intentionally misleading the trial
court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal."
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220. Defendant's allegation of unfair
prejudice in this Court should be rejected as constituting
invited error.

State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989)

("invited error [] is procedurally unjustified and viewed with
disfavor" (citing State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah
1987)).

As demonstrated supra, Part A, defendant knew that

Defense Exhibit #1 had not made it into the jury room prior to
the jury verdict.

Nevertheless, defense counsel waited until

after the jury verdict was rendered to move for a mistrial;
18

thereby precluding the trial court an opportunity to fashion an
appropriate remedy.

Under this circumstance, any error was

invited by defendant's failure to timely raise the issue and
defendant should not be allowed to benefit from the error on
appeal.

Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220 ("a party cannot take advantage

of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial
court into committing the error").

Indeed, had defendant taken

the trouble to see that her defense

exhibits were give to the

jury, this issue would not have arisen.

Consequently, defendant

"must bear some of the responsibility for the oversight."

State

v. Buckley, 546 A. 2d 798, 799 (Vt. 1988) .6 It necessarily
follows that the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for
mistrial on the above stated grounds did not constitute an abuse
of its considerable discretion.

State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 6

(Utah 1993) .
C.

Failure to Marshal

Notwithstanding its waiver ruling, the trial court
alternatively ruled that defendant was not unfairly prejudiced by
the fact that Defense Exhibit #1 was not made available to the
jury during its deliberations:
[I]t's my judgment that having listened to
the evidence during the trial and the
arguments of the parties [,] that the contents
of Exhibit 1 were adequately and repeatedly
described to the jury and that there was
6

Defendant has not argued that his trial counsel (who is
also appellate counsel) was ineffective in failing to timely
bring the issue to the court's attention; thus, neither the State
nor the Court need engage in that analysis. Dunn, 850 P.2d at
1220 n.19.
19

really no dispute about what Exhibit 1 said.
And therefore, I certainly would have
preferred to have the jury have it there in
the event they wanted to look at it but they
did not ask where it was which indicated they
did not, at least I think it's reasonable to
believe that they did not consider it a
disputed question what Exhibit 1 said. It
was something that had admittedly been
argued, certainly been argued by the
defendant extensively but that meant that the
jury was very much aware of that exhibit and
so I don't find that there is prejudice to
the [d]efendant in the fact that Exhibit 1
was not given to the jury to review. So the
motion for mistrial is denied.
(Tr. 237-38), see Addendum D.
Defendant has not challenged the foregoing findings as
clearly erroneous.
1990).

State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah

He has neither marshalled the evidence in support of the

trial court's findings, nor demonstrated how it is insufficient.
Id.: State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App.) ("An
appellant raising issues of fact on appeal must, under Utah
R.Civ.P. 52(a), marshal all the evidence supporting the trial
court's findings, and then show that evidence to be
insufficient."), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991).
Accordingly, this Court must reject defendant's allegation of
unfair prejudice and must instead assume the correctness of the
trial court's findings to the contrary.

State v. Larsen, 828

P.2d 487, 490 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah
1992), aff'd, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court should uphold the
denial of defendant's motions to suppress and for mistrial, and
should also affirm defendant's narcotic related convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s c ^ X a a y of November,

1994,

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

>IAN DECKER
sistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four tru*- and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
RANDALL GAITHER, attorney for appellant, 321 South 600 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84102, this

day of November, 1994.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

IN THE JUSTICE COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT

No. *fAf-

#0^/

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the State of Utah
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me
by Williar. Pierce, I am satisfied that there is a probable cause to
believe that on the premises of
The mobile home and house, outbuildings, vehicles, located on
the following described property. (Copy of Warranty Deed also
attached,)
Beg. at a point 32.0 ft S 0 deg. 16' W and 417.42 ft S 86 deg.
53'W of the NE corner of Sec. 9, T29S, R24E, SLB&M, and running
thence S 0 deg. 161 W 208.71 ft, thence S 86 deg. 531 W 208.71 ft,
thence N 0 deg. 16' W. 208.71 ft, thence N 86 deg. 53' E 208.71 ft
to the pob.
Beg. at a point 32.0 ft. S 0 deg. 16' W and 626.13 ft. S. 86
deg 53' W of the NE corner of Sec. 9, T29S, R24E, SLB&M., and
running thence S. 0 deg 16f W 208.71 ft., thence N. 86 deg. 53* E.
208.71 ft. to the pob.
More commonly known as the Steven Richard Schultz residence.
Or in the vehicle(s) described as
Black two tone Chev. Pickup, unknown Missouri plates,
and Light blue 1985 Ford pickup, Utah lie. No. 925ZBE
and a blue and white 1976 Ford Pickup, Lie No. 8437 CV
In the County of San Juan, State of Utah, there is now being
possessed or concealed certain property or evidence described as:

Cultivation of Marijuana and other possession of other
controlled substances, and that said property or evidence which
consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conducts
You are therefore commanded:

at any time day or night.

PAGE TWO
SEARCH WARRANT
to make a search of the above-named or described premises, and/or
vehicle(s), on the herein-above described property or evidence and
if you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith
before me at the Justice Court, County of San Juan, State of Utah,
or retain such property in your custody, subject to the order of
this court.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this 1st day of October, 1993

^

JU&SE Harold G.'Muhlestein
Justice Court

IN THE JUSTICE COURT

'.JAJ-

IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of SAN JUAN )

4
#

ss

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
BEFORE:

Justice Court Judge Muhlestein, Monticello, Utah

The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
William Pierce
That he has reason to believe that on the premises of :
The mobile home and house, outbuildings, vehicles, located on
the following described property. (Copy of Warranty Deed also
attached.)
Beg. at a point 32.0 ft S 0 deg. 16f W and 417.42 ft S 86 deg.
53'W of the NE corner of Sec. 9, T29S, R24E, SLB&M, and running
thence S 0 deg. 16' W 208.71 ft, thence S 86 deg. 53' W 208.71 ft,
thence N 0 deg. 16' W 208.71 ft, thence N 86 deg. 53* E 208.71 ft
to the pob»
Beg. at a point 32.0 ft. S 0 deg. 16' W and 626.13 ft. S. 86
deg 53' W of the NE corner of Sec. 9, T29S, R24E, SLB&M., and
running thence S. 0 deg 16' W 208.71 ft., thence N. 86 deg. 53' E.
208.71 ft. to the pob.
Commonly known as the Steven Robert Schultz property*
and/or

in the vehicle(s) described as:

Black two tone Chev. Pickup, unknown Missouri plates,
and Light blue 1985 Ford pickup, Utah lie. No. 925ZBE
and a blue and white 1976 Ford Pickup, Lie No. 8437 CV
In the San Juan County, State of Utah there is now certain property
or evidence described as:
Cultivation of Marijuana and other controlled substances,
and that said property or evidence which consists of an item or
constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a party to
the illegal conduct;

1

Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is
evidence of the crime(s) of Cultivation of Marijuana and possession
of controlled substances*

The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Karrant
are:
Information obtained from confidential informant indicates that the
property described is being used to cultivate marijuana* The
confidential informant also indicates that marijuana and other
controlled substances are kept in the vehicles and buildings on the
property.
Confidential informant states that he has observed
controlled substances in possession of one Laura Miller over the
last few months* in her possession, in the structures (there are
out buildings, a house and mobile home on the property), and in the
vehicles she has access to on the property.
Confidential informant indicated he had viewed the use of marijuana
and "crack" on the property over the last few months by Miller and
two unknown males from Moab, Ut.
Your affiant considers the information
confidential informant reliable because;

received

from

the

Confidential informant is known to the requesting officer for two
years and has known to be a reliable and truthful individual^.
Your affiant has verified the above information from the
confidential informant to be correct and accurate through the
following independent investigation:
The confidential informant indicated specific location on the
property were the marijuana is being cultivated. He described the
position relative to the building and trees.
He provided
photographs of the live marijuana plants. Through plain view of
the property from a public access road the location can be seen and
his description verified. Although only the tall grass can be seen
as described and seen in the provided photographs.

WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for
the seizure of said items:
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason to
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or
altered, or for other good reasons, to wit: can be
easily destroyed
2

H(J<-£^

AFFIANT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 1st day of October, 1993.

/

/

/

4U:
JUDGE

C/X

I'

IN THE JUSTICE COURT,
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

Si

Recorded *t Request «* S ° u t h Eastern Utah T i t l e Co.

by

Jane 1 8 , 19&L
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l £ L Dtp. Book_222_ P H -

>I»iJ Ux notice to Stephen P. Schult2

R«f.-/3»000lfi2

AAt>r*<* 600 Heidelberg Ln. Johnstown, PA
lb905

WARRANTY DEED
•M CHARD L. SttlTH
of Beaver
CONVEY and WARRANT
H&

f

County of

grantor
• SUte of Utah, hci tby

Beaver

to

STEPHEN ROBERT SCKULTO

of 600 Heidelberg Ln, J o h n s t o n , PA 2E905
Ten and no/100 (510.00) and other good and valuable c o n s i d e r a t i o n

grantee
for the fjm of
DOLLARS,

the following described tracts of Und in
San Juan
County,
State of l)Uh:
5 .Beginning a t a point 3 2 . 0 f t S 0 d e g . 2 6 ' W and 4 1 7 . 4 2 f t S 66 deg. 53* W o f
6 the Northeast corner of Sec 9, T295, 1 Z24Z, SL&fcM, and rjr.nin$ thence S 0 deg.
• 16' W 208.71 ft, thence S 86 deg. 53 W 206.71 ft, thence N 0 deg. 16' W 2C8.71 ft,
£ thence N 86 deg. S3' L 208.71 ft to the point of beginning.
deserving, however, frorr. the operation of this deed an undivided one half iL.) of
all numeralsi oil and natural gas, together \.ith the right to rune arid x&c>e s&r.e
without liability to the surface owner.
ALSO
©.Beginning at a point 32.0 ft, S 0°16' W and 626.13 ft. S 86°53* W of the
5 Northeast corner of Sec. 9, T29S, R24E, SLEiM., and running thence S. 0 16* W
S 208.71 ft., thence S 66 S31 W 208.71 ft., thence N 0°16% E 208.71 ft., thence N.
g 86 53' E. 206.71 ft. to the point of beginning.
c

Reserving However, from the Of^ration of this c^ed an undivided on half C;) of e l l
irinerals, o i l , and natural ges, together with the right to mine and remove sara
without liability to trie surface owner.

WITNESS, the hind
JUNE

of said grantor

.this
, A. D. 19 91

Signed in the Presence of

1?

^h

day of

» / C w
cfi <-&~uZ%)
Richard L. Suth

STATE OF UTAH,

1

County of

J

Beaver

/v
'

(7^

Soum Cuttm utit>
Order NO j u f 2 ^ £ j £ k r

On the
12th
diyof
June
personally appeared before me
Richard L. Srith
the signer

of the vithjnfos^rarr.ent,who duly *cV:n;w)*dged to

[V-lTX

tt^i4l£ft|
?

My commission t»r rt» y

Ul

*

J
/g>
f

^
Residing i n P / z U V ^

»^A*K * >Ct—»*«»*»Tt £««»—£ OfcM P M N T l K O C O — »»V» V«»l CM*

J N u U r y PwUic.
(l^A..
»3

W

ITEMS CONFICATEDS AS A RESULT OF THE SEARCH:
ONE METAL CONTAINER USED AS A POT FOR MARIJUANA PLANT DISCOVERED
OUTSIDE
ONE LARGE LIVE MARIJUANA PLANT
ONE FILM CONTAINER DISCOVERED IN THE 1985 FORD PICK-UP CONTAINING
MARIJUANA
ONE FILM CONTAINER DISCOVERED IN THE MASTER BEDROOM CONTAINING
MARIJUANA
ONE PIPE DISCOVERED IN THE LIVINGROOM/KITCHEN AREA
ONE BAGGIE OF MARIJUANA DISCOVERED IN THE DESK IN THE LIVING ROOM
CONTAINED ALSO TWO PIPES

ADDENDUM B

S£i J J

RANDALL GAITHER
#1141
Attorney for Defendant
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-1990

FILED

'

W >-

FEB " *

1994

CLERK OF THE COURT

BY,

Deputy

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Plaintiff,

vs.
LAURA RUTH MILLER

Criminal No: 9317-273

Defendant.
The Defendant, Laura Ruth Miller, hereby moves the Court to
enter an Order suppressing the following:
1.

All information seized from the residence at P.O. Box 96,

La Sal, Lzah 84530, based upon a search warrant issued by the
Justice Court, San Juan County, State of Utah, on October 1, 1993.
2.

All statements made by the Defendant in custody pursuant

to the warrant and prior to the Defendant's being advised rights
pursuant to Miranda.
3.

This Motion is based upon the Memorandum and affidavits

submitted with this Motion or to be submitted and upon Article I,
Section 12, and Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and
Amendments 4, 5, 6, and 14/£f the United States Constitution.
DATED this .

day of Janu&yV, 1994.

2S

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MOTION TO SUPPRESS was mailed postage prepaid to:
Craig C. Halls
San Juan County Attorney
P.O. Box 850
Monticello, Utah 84535
DATED this _<&£5

day of January, 1994.

IN THE JUSTICE COURT

'.JAJ'

IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAB
STATE OF UTAH

)
* fi S

County of SAN JUAN

)
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

BEFORE:

Justice Court Judge Muhlestein, Monticello, Utah

The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
William Pierce
That he has reason to believe that on the premises of :
The mobile home and house, outbuildings, vehicles, located on
the following described property. (Copy of Warranty Deed also
attached.)
Beg. at a point 32.0 ft S 0 deg. 16f W and 417.42 ft S 86 deg.
53'W of the NE corner of Sec. 9, T29S, R24E, SLB&M, and running
thence S 0 deg. 16' W 208.71 ft, thence S 86 deg. S31 W 208.71 ft,
thence N 0 deg. 16' W 208.71 ft, thence N 86 deg. 53* E 208.71 ft
to the pob.
Beg. at a point 32.0 ft. S 0 deg. 16' W and 626.13 ft. S. 86
deg 53 • W of the NE corner of Sec. 9, T29S, R24E, SLBSM., and
running thence S. 0 deg 16f W 208.71 ft., thence N. 86 deg. 53' E.
208.71 ft. to the pob.
Commonly known as the Steven Robert Schultz property*
and/or

in the vehicle(s) described as:

Black two tone Chev. Pickup, unknown Missouri plates,
and Light blue 1985 Ford pickup, Utah lie. No. 925ZBE
and a blue and white 1976 Ford Pickup, Lie No. 8437 CV
In the San Juan County, State of Utah there is now certain property
or evidence described as:
Cultivation of Marijuana and other controlled substances,
and that said property or evidence which consists of an item or
constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a party to
the illegal conduct;

1

Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is
evidence of the crime(s) of Cultivation of Marijuana and possession
of controlled substances.

The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant
are:
Information obtained from confidential informant indicates that the
property described is being used to cultivate marijuana. The
confidential informant also indicates that marijuana ancT other
controlled substances are kept in the vehicles and buildings on the
property.
Confidential informant states that he has observed
controlled substances in possession of one Laura Miller over the
last few months, in her possession, in the structures (there are
out buildings, a house and mobile home on the property), and in the
vehicles she has access to on the property.
Confidential informant indicated he had viewed the use of marijuana
and "crack" on the property over the last few months by Miller and
two unknown males from Moab, Ut.
Your affiant considers the information
confidential informant reliable because:

received

from

the
^

\

Confidential informant is known to the requesting officer for two
years and has known to be a reliable and truthful individual.
Your affiant has verified the above information from the
confidential informant to be correct and accurate through the
following independent investigation:
The confidential informant indicated specific location on the
property were the marijuana is being cultivated. He described the
position relative to the building and trees.
He provided
photographs of the live marijuana plants. Through plain view of
the property from a public access road the location can be seen and
his description verified. Although only the tall grass can be seen
as described and seen in the provided photographs.

WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for
the seizure of said items:
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason to
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or
altered, or for other good reasons, to wit: can be
easily destroyed

2

•dlj-C-i^

AFFIANT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 1st day of October, 1993

JUDGE

V

IN THE JUSTICE COURT,
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

Si

Recorded *t Request «t
iljLill—.

^ / * •' --' '

South Eastern Utah Title Co. June 18, 19£h ...

M . Fee Paid f

7 -^n__

by

Tftn'^

r

W » «

-

CAn

."Tr^n P r i n » y C ^ r / ^ f

i c i _ Dep. B o o k _ 2 1 2 _ *H" 278

Mail tax notice <Q Stephen P. Schultz

Arif?r**«

M..

J2' Q D Q l

600 Heidelberg Ln.

£ 2

Johnstown, PA
15905

WARRANTY DEED
•RICHARD L. SttlTO
cf Denver
CONVEY and WARRANT

, County of

grantor
, Statt of Utah, hci eby

Beaver

to

•STEPHEN ROBERT SCKULTZ

&
grantee
for the f j n of
DOLLARS,

of 600 Heidelberg Ln. J o h n s t o n , PA
1S905
Ten and no/100 ( 5 1 0 . 0 0 ) and o t h e r ^ c o i and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n

g
C
«
£

the following described tracts of land in
San Juan
County,
State of Utah:
*B&iinnin<4 a t a p a i n t 3 2 . 0 f t S 0 dec*. 16* w and 4 1 7 . 4 2 f t S 66 d e o . 5 3 ' W of
t h e Northeast corner of Sec 9, T29S, R24E, SLB&M, and r j n n i n g t h e n c e S 0 d e y .
16* W 208.71 f t , t h e n c e S 86 d e g . S>2' W 208.71 f t , t h e n c e N 0 d e g . 1 6 ' W 2U.ll
ft,
t h e n c e K 86 c e g . 5 3 ' L 208.71 f t t o t h e p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g .
R e s e r v i n g , however, frorr. t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h i s deed an undivided one h a l f (h)
a l l f u n e r a l s , Oil and r.ctural u s , t o g e t h e r \ . i t h t h e r i ^ h t t o rune arid it£ic*e

of
aar.e

withojt l i a b i l i t y t o the surface owner.
ALSO
©.Beginning at a point 32.0 f t . S 0°16' W and 626.13 f t . S B6°53' W of the
5 Northeast corner of Sec. 9, T29S, R24E, SLSiM., and running thence S. 0 16' W
* 208.71 f t . , thence S S6 0 53 l W 208.71 f t . , thence N O 0 ^ 1 E 206.71 f t . , thence N.
£ 86 53' E. 206.71 f t . t o the point of beginning.
Reserving However, frcrr, the o ^ r a t i o n of this c^ed an undivided on half (h) of a l l
irjnerals, o i l , &rd natural gas, together with the right t o rune and remove sa,-ne
withojt l i a b i l i t y t o the surface owner.

WITNESS, the hand
JUNE

of aaid grantor

, this
, A . D. 19 91

Signed in the Presence of

I

STATE OF UTAH,
Couctyof

1?lh

&£~*
<* *&~uZ%
Richard L. S*uth

1
I
J

Beaver

day of

/ v
^ £
(7*

Soui* tastem uian
T»Ut Company
o>g»r NO m\*//S£

Oc the
32th
day of
Jjne
personally appeared before mt
Richard L. S r i t h

• A. D. 19 91

the signer. of the vithjn fosj.rjjjrnent, who d\ily ackn:*)tdged to rne that
same.
,<r*

Q,,^
U

>fy commission »*pi"« Sj'^> *
in

^

Residing ** ul/Atu*

^ ^

he

executed the

£&.*•
]

Notary Public.

(l*h\ U
-

.

*i

ITEMS CONFICATEDS AS A RESULT OF THE SEARCH:
ONE METAL CONTAINER USED AS A POT FOR MARIJUANA PLANT DISCOVERED
OUTSIDE
ONE LARGE LIVE MARIJUANA PLANT
ONE FILM CONTAINER DISCOVERED IN THE 1985 FORD PICK-UP CONTAINING
MARIJUANA
ONE FILM CONTAINER DISCOVERED IN THE MASTER BEDROOM CONTAINING
MARIJUANA
ONE PIPE DISCOVERED IN THE LIVINGROOM/KITCHEN AREA
ONE BAGGIE OF MARIJUANA DISCOVERED IN THE DESK IN THE LIVING ROOM
CONTAINED ALSO TWO PIPES

Sai ^ **• C:

RANDALL GAITHER
#1141
Attorney for Defendant
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-1990

F.L2D

Ay

f£% - if 199^
CtERK OF THE COURT

BY.

Deputy

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

I
)
]

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS

I

Criminal No: 9317-273

vs.
LAURA RUTH MILLER
Defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Attached hereto is a copy an the SEARCH WARRANT served on

October 1, 1993.
2.

Attached hereto is a copy of The AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH

WARRANT which is the basis for the issuance of the warrant.
3.

As a result of the search pursuant to the warrant issued

on the basis of the AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT, all of the
controlled substances to be introduced in evidence at trial.
POINT X
THE SEARCH WARRANT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
ISSUED WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE IN LIGHT OF
MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION OF FACTS AND
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE IATERIAL FACTS TO
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE ISSUING THE WARRANT.

WAS
THE
THE
THE

In Franks vs. Delaware. 438 U.S. 154 (1978) the United States
Supreme Court ruled that a search warrant can be challenged based
upon misstatements in the search warrant when the misstatements are
recklessly made or knowingly false information.

That information

VA

must be deleted under Franks in reviewing the sufficiency of the
affidavit.

If the statements are necessary to a finding of

probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits
thereof suppressed.
The test to determine whether any misrepresentation or false
statements contained in an affidavit is material to establishment
of probable cause and is based upon an objection determination as
to whether the warrant would have been issued if the magistrate has
been given accurate information. United States vs. Page, 808 F.2d
723, cert. den. 482 U.S. 918 (10th Cir. 1987). In Page, the Tenth
Circuit

Court

indicated

even

if

non-intentional

errors

are

material, the errors should be considered or false statements under
the "totality of the circumstance" standard and not considered as
to probable cause.

The Court said a magistrate issuing a warrant

must first make a practical, common sense decision as to whether
there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place.

Whether the affidavit involves hearsay

conclusion or a expert, a magistrate would not have a substantial
basis for concluding [ing] that probable cause existed if the expert
affidavit was based on material errors. Gates, supra 212-14 citing
Jones v. United States. 362 US 257 (1060). The validity of a search
warrant must be assessed on the basis of information that the
agents had actually disclosed or has a duty to disclose to the
issuing magistrate.

Maryland v. Garrisonf 480 U.S. 79 (1987).

In State v. Brown. 798 P 2d 284 (Utah 1990), the Utah Court of
Appeals

in

relation

to

search

warrants

issued

on

hearsay

information noted that the Courts view the testimony of citizen

informers with less rigid scrutiny than the testimony of police
informers, citing State v. Tredwav, 499 P. 2d, 846 (Utah, 1972).
The Court stated that in cases not involving citizen informants
that the two-pronged test of Aouilar v. Texas. 378 U.S. 108 (1964)
which requires circumstances which establish the basis of knowledge
of the informant and the informant's veracity or reliability should
be considered in determining whether there is probable cause for
the Warrant.
In Brown, the Court also discusses briefly the issue which is
raised by the Appellants in this case concerning the knowingly, or
with reckless inclusion of information which shows a disregard for
the truth, including false and misleading information.

The Court

of Appeals cited the case of Franks v. Delaware, Supra, where the
United States Supreme Court held that if a Defendant shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that the affiant made a false
statement, intentionally, knowingly or with reckless disregard for
the truth, the false material must be set to one side and probable
cause determined by the Affidavit's remaining content.
In United States v. Boyce. 601 F. Supp. 947 (D.C.Min., 1985),
the Court ruled that an Defendant is entitled to a evidentiary
hearing to challenge the veracity of a search warrant affidavit if
he makes a substantial preliminary showing of reckless disregard of
the truth.

Intentional or reckless omissions from search warrant

affidavits were indicated to as equally serious as affirmative
misrepresentations including information concerning the informant's
status and other factors which would have been important to the
magistrate to determine the issue of probable cause.

At the Preliminary Hearing held in this case, the principal
investigation Officer testified that the confidential informant not
disclosed in the warrant was a person identified as Hans Guhr, a
non-police officer and a person with pending criminal charges. He
indicated that upon cross-examination that the
POINT II
THE AFFIDAVIT, ON IT'S FACE DOES NOT MEET THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIRED STANDARD FOR USE OF
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT INFORMATION.
In the case of State v. Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court set
forth the requirements
concerning

independent

a warrant must
verification

contain
of

on

it#s

information

face
from

confidential informant. The Court indicated the following the case
of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S., 213 (1983), the warrant must
establish a tight web of circumstantial evidence supporting the
reliability of the allegations of the confidential informant. The
Court indicated that depending on the circumstances, a showing of
the basis of knowledge and veracity or reliability of the person
providing the information for a warrant may well be necessary to
establish that, with a fair probability, evidence sought actually
exists and can be found where the informant claims.
In State vs. Singleton, 214 Utah Adv. Rep 30 (1993) the Court
of Appeals stated:
Utah courts, however, have used the
AguilarSpinelli
factors as guides in applying the
M
totality-of-the-circumstances
test.
[A]n
%
informant's ^reliability' and
basis of
knowledge'are but two relevant considerations,
among other, in determining the existence of
probable cause
under *a totality-of-the
circumstances.f%% Hansenf 732 P.2d at 130
(citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 231-32,235-36, 103
S. Ct. at 2328-31). See also State v. Puruse.

828 P.2d 515-517. (Utah App. 1992).
The
Aguilar-Spinelli
guidelines are not applied as
"strict, independent requirements to be
*rigidly exacted' in every case. A weakness
in one or the other is not fatal to the
warrant so long as in the totality there is
substantial basis to find probable cause.'1
Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130 (citing Gates,
462
U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332).
In an analysis of the Search Warrant in this case indicates
that the officer made misrepresentations concerning the important
factor of corroboration of the confidential informant.

The

evidence will also indicate that the affiant to the search warrant
failed to disclose relevant and important information concerning
the unreliability of the informant such as benefits, compensation
and other inducements given to have the confidential informant to
give the information.

The Defendant will present evidence that

POINT III
ANY STATEMENTS MAY BE EITHER DEFENDANT WHILE
IN THE RESIDENCE MUST BE SUPPRESSED UNDER
MIRANDA VS. ARIZONA
In the case of State vs. Mircruet. 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (Ct.
App. 1992) the Utah Court of Appeals found that a defendant was in
custody at the time that he was told to retrieve marijuana was
entitled to Miranda protection. In that case, the Court went on to
suppress the incriminating evidence.

In that case, the Defendant

was located in a Highway Patrol Officers vehicle when he was
interrogated about the location of marijuana.
The Court listed several factors to determine whether a person
was in custody and those factors are as follows:

1.

The site of the interrogation.

2.

Whether the investigation focused on the Defendant,

3.

Whether the objection indicia of arrest were present.

4.

The length and form of interrogation.

5.

The person freely arrived at the place of interrogation.

The Court in that case, suppressed the physical evidence of
the marijuana found as a result of the Miranda violations and the
Court indicated that a remedy for the Miranda violations would
include the suppression of physical evidence.
In

the

present

matter,

incriminating

statement

of

the

Defendant were made pending and during the time she was in custody
pending the search warrant execution process.

CONCLUSION
The Defendants submit that the evidence will be introduced at
the hearing to justify suppression of an illegal search which took
place under an invalid warrant.
DATED this

*M.
//

I day of January, 1994

</sr

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM IS SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS was mailed postage
prepaid to:
Craig c. Halls
San Juan County Attorney
P.O. Box 850
Monticello, Utah 84535
DATED this

e-*Q

day of January, 1994.

ADDENDUM C

SEVENTH DISTRICT CO J r

CRAIG C. HALLS #1317
San Juan County Attorney
P. 0. Box 850
Monticello, Utah 84535
Phone 587-2128

«-a> MAR 0 8 :334
CLERK OF THE COURT
BY
Deputy

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

*
*

FINDING OF FACT
AND ORDER

*

Criminal No. 9317-273

vs.
LAURA MILLER,
Defendant(s).

*

This matter came on before the Court on Defendants Motion to
Suppress on the

4th day of February, 1994. Defendant was present

and represented by counsel, Randall Gaither. The State was present
and represented by Craig C. Halls.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Court finds that the search was conducted pursuant to
a warrant and that the Defendant has the burden of going forward
and showing that the warrant was deficient.
2.

Having heard all of the witnesses in this case the Court

finds that the information given to the Officer in this case was:
a.

That the confidential informant lived at the

residence immediately before the information was given.
b.

That the Officer had in his possession pictures of

what he believed to be Marijuana plants described as being

1

located on the property.
c. That the informant had been a caretaker of this
property and was allowed to remain on the properties even
after difficulties had arisen with other persons who had
lived or been trusted there.
d. That the description of the premises given
by the informant was borne out through independent
investigation by the Officer.
e.

That the Officer viewed the properties at the

location where the informant had said the plants were
being cultivated from a public access and verified that
the description was similar to what had been expressed to
him earlier.
3.

The Court finds that the seeming inconsistency in the

search warrant with regard to the amount of time that the Officer
had known the confidential informant was apparently in error based
upon the testimony, but that this error was not reckless and was
not material and did not change the sufficiency in the warrant.
4.

The Court finds that no other part of the warrant was

reckless and that information with regard to the confidential
informant relationship to the people on the property and possible
motive was not borne out by the evidence and was not of a
substantial enough nature to change the sufficiency of the warrant
and was not required to be expressed in the warrant to make the
warrant sufficient.
5.

The Court finds that after these supposed incidents

2

occurred which bias the confidential informant, that the owner of
the property retained him as a care taker of the property.
6.

The Court further finds upon hearing the testimony of the

owner of the property and the defendant that their testimony was
not as reliable as evidence placed into the record by the Officer.
7.

The Court finds that warrant was sufficient, that the

information express in the warrant provided probable cause to
believe that marijuana plants may have been cultivated on the
property at the time in question.

That this was sufficiently set

forth by the warrant and that the warrant was sufficient.
IT IS THEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Defendant's
Motion to Suppress is hereby denied.
DATED this

9lK

day of March, 1994.

Jucige Lyle R. Anderson
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Mr. Randall Gaither, at
321 South 600 E., S.L.C. Ut. 84102 this _££& day of March, 1994,
by placing same postage prepaid in the Monticello Post Office.
Julie Wood

3

ADDENDUM D

thought I had got those all out.
MR. HALLS:

I went through all of those

instructions, Your Honor, and the ones that I had given and
told the Court that I thought they were in pretty shape and
in going through all those and checking for spelling and all
that kind of stuff, all the places it says "his" I didn't
even think about it.
THE COURT:

I read through them and then when I

get here in Court and Ifm reading them out loud all of a
sudden all these typos jump out at me.

It woulc* be nice if

we could get all those, they're better than the last set
anyway.
The Court will be in recess pending the return of
the jury.
(Whereupon a recess was taken.)
THE COURT:

The record will show that the parties

are here and the counsel are here and I guess the bailiff
has informed us that the jury has reached a verdict.
Let's see, Mr. Eardley, it looks like you are the
fore person, at least you are the paper carrier.
All right, to have the clerk read the verdicts.
THE CLERK:
Miller, Defendant.

The State of Utah versus Laura Ruth

We the jury duly impaneled and sworn in

the above entitled case do find the Defendant, Laura Ruth
Miller, guilty of unlawfully producing a controlled
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substance.

Dated this 26th day of April, a.d., 1994.

Signed J. Terry Eardley, Foreperson.
The State of Utah versus Laura Ruth Miller, Case
No. 9317273.

We the jury duly impaneled and sworn in the

above entitled case do find the Defendant, Laura Ruth
Miller, guilty of possession of a controlled substance.
Dated this 26th day of April, a.d., 1994 and signed J. Terry
Eardley, Foreperson.
The State of Utah versus Laura Ruth Miller, Case
No. 9317273.

We the jury duly impaneled and sworn in the

above entitled case do find the Defendant, Laura Ruth
Miller, guilty of possession of paraphernalia.
26th day of April, a.d., 1994.

Dated this

Signed J. Terry Eardley,

Foreperson.
THE COURT:

Mr. Gaither, do you wish the jury

polled?
MR. GAITHER:
THE COURT:
service.

No, Your Honor.
Members of the jury, I appreciate your

I know that it f s been a sacrifice for you to be

here for two days and that these kinds of decisions are
difficult to make because you have to say to someone in
effect I believe you committed a crime.
that's easy for any of us to do.
your service.

And I don't think

I do want to thank you for

You maybe interested to know that Count 1 of

which you convicted the Defendant is what we call a Third
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1

Degree Felony.

It's punishable by up to five years in

2 I

prison if I make a determination to send the Defendant to

3

prison and/ of course, there's lots of other things I can

4

do.

5

complete certain treatment programs successfully.

6

require that she go and spend some time in jail, that she do

7 J

some sort of community service.

8

there's a whole agency of State government devoted to

9

supervising people on probation and recommending to Courts

I can put her on probation.

I can require that she
I can

Lots of options I have and

10

what they should do with someone that's convicted of an

11

offense.

12

So that's something that I can do.
The other two offenses are Class B Misdemeanors

13

and I could put the Defendant in jail for six months on each

14 J

one of those and there's also fines with each one of these

15

that I can require the Defendant pay a fine.

16

Now, counsel, I'd like to have a pre-sentence

17

investigation report before I make a decision as to what the

18

sentence should be.

19
20 J

MR. GAITHER:

Your Honor, I have a motion to make

outside the presence of the jury.

21

THE COURT:

We'll address that.

22

Members of the jury, you now are free to talk to

23 J

anyone you want to about this case or not to talk to them.

24 J

It's certainly your decision if you don't want to talk about

25 I

this.

You have no obligation to do that, but I now remove

232

any restrictions I may have placed on you with regard to
this case.

You can do what you want to about talking about

it.
Let's see, I'm trying to think if you have any
other questions about what you can do.
covers it.

You are free to go now.

I think that about

If you haven't received

your jury fee for the second day, make sure you stop and
pick it up at the clerk's office.

You don't have to leave

but I am going to excuse you from the jury box so that
you'll feel free to come in and out as you may chose.
have a few more things to address right now.
excused from the jury box.

We

So you're

If you want to stay and watch

what happens now, you're welcome to do that.
And the note pads, we'll either take those, you
can either take your notes with you and do what you want
with them or leave them here and we'll destroy them.
MR. HALLS:
need to indicate.
letter.

Your Honor, I have a matter that I

As I made my closing arguments I had this

It was placed on the desk.

It didn't go in the jury room.

I put it in my stuff.

It's Exhibit 1.

I think

that's what the motion, I just as the jury was coming in
showed it to Mr. Gaither.

So I want the Court to know that

that's—
MR. GAITHER:

Yes, Your Honor, at this time the

Defendant would move the Court for a mistrial.

The
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prosecutor, he did show me before the jury came back in.

In

fact, he had, Ifm sure by inadvertence he had taken an
exhibit that did not go into the jury which is Exhibit 1.

I

would point out that that was a key exhibit to the defense.
I referred to that exhibit specifically.
to read that exhibit.
that.

I asked the jury

There was no other document that said

As far as I was concerned in my closing argument, if

my closing argument is reviewed that was the central basis
to the defense is that Hans Guhr had started out making
false statements and that he was suspect in the case and the
information that he gave to the police was false and they
did not have it and this is an exhibit that was not in the
jury room and I believe that there's no way that the Court
can find that that is not prejudicial.
the defense.

It's important to

I understand it was inadvertence on the part

of the prosecutor.

I'm not saying he took it intentionally

but on the other hand it's fundamental that all exhibits go
into the jury and that they have all the exhibits before
them, that they consider all of the exhibits.

So I would

move the Court for a mistrial setting aside the jury
verdict.
THE COURT:

Mr. Halls?

MR. HALLS:

I appreciate Mr. Gaither's indication

that he believe that that was inadvertent which it was.
Your Honor, I think if there's an issue here, if there is
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any difficulty here it was not central to the juryfs
determination of what the verdict would have been whether
they had that or didn't have it.
by all parties.

It was adequately argued

It was to the jury in a couple of different

ways by Mr. Gaither and parts of it by myself.

If there is

any error in that I believe itfs harmless error and if he
wants to argue that to the Court of Appeals I believe that's
the appropriate for that to be done.

I don't think that on

that basis that the thing should be a mistrial.
THE COURT:

Mr. Halls, when did you notice that

you had that exhibit?
MR. HALLS:

As I walked in here and sat down.

THE COURT:

Why did neither one of you mention

this to me before I asked for the jury verdict.

I could

have sent that in with them and said you didn't have the
exhibits.

Here, here's an additional exhibit.

take your verdict.

You consider whether that affects your

verdict and then come back in.
me to do that?

We won't

Why didn't either of you ask

This is something that could easily have

been corrected simply by sending the jury back out with that
exhibit and there would have been no question.

I would not

take their verdict from them until they had considered
whether that would make a difference.
MR. GAITHER:

Again, in response, this gets to the

basis of a jury trial.

They are supposed to have all of the
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exhibits and all of the evidence and, again, this was key.
This was the document that I said you need to take a look
at.

Please read and deliberate on this.

there before the jury.

And it wasn't in

So they did not have all of the

exhibits and I think that we would move the Court for a
mistrial•
THE COURT:

All right.

I find that the Defendant

has not raised this in timely fashion.

She knew about it,

admittedly shortly before the verdict was received but she
knew about it in time that this could have been raised in
time to correct it by sending the jury back before the
verdict was received.
MR. GAITHER:

This was done as the jury was

walking in and-MR. HALLS:
went out.

No, it was done before the bailiff

Your Honor, I walked in and sat down here.

I

opened up my file and there was the document and I pulled it
out and I said,

ft

Oops.,f

He shook his head and said, Oh.

And it was before the Judge came in.

In fact, it was before

you walked in the room.
MR. GAITHER:

I don't believe that the Defendant

or myself has an obligation to, this isn't a mistake that, I
mean I didn't have the exhibit.
exhibit.

Mr. Halls knew he had the

As the Court has indicated he could have said

something to the Court.

He didn't say anything to the
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Court,

As far as I'm concerned it was a mistrial at the

time it went in there at the time of deliberation.

It would

have been error, after they have reached a verdict to send
that back in.

I was representing my client to the best of

my abilities.

I did not know of any requirement that said

that I had to point out the fact that the prosecutor has an
exhibit there to the Court.

My client should not be held, I

don't think that the Court can find a waiver in this
situation based on those facts and circumstances.
THE COURT:

I do find that the Defendant was aware

but before the jury was brought into the courtroom and
certainly before the Court received the verdict and had it
read.

Certainly not before the jury had indicated that they

had reached a decision.

But I can send them back before

they have announced the decision and any fact, even
afterwards I can send them back saying, wait a minute, I
think there is something here that is a problem.

I think I

could send them back even then to reconsider their verdict
in the light of additional information.
And even if that were not the case, it's my
judgment that having listened to the evidence during the
trial and the arguments of the parties that the contents of
Exhibit 1 were adequately and repeatedly described to the
jury and that there was really no dispute about what Exhibit
1 said.

And therefore, I certainly would have preferred to
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1

I

have the jury have it there in the event they wanted to look

2

1

at it but they did not ask where it was which indicated they

3

I

did not, at least I think it's reasonable to believe that

4

they did not consider it a disputed question what Exhibit 1

5

said.

6

certainly been argued by the defendant extensively but that

7

meant ti*at the jury was very much aware of that exhibit and

8

I

9

It was something that had admittedly been argued,

so I don't find that there is prejudice to the Defendant in
the fact that Exhibit 1 was not given to the jury to review.

10

I

11

I

So the motion for mistrial is denied.
(End of requested transcription.)

12
13
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15
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17
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STATE OF UTAH

C E R T I F I C A T E
)

:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the transcript of the
court audio tapes in the foregoing matter were
transcribed by me, Carolyn Erickson, a Notary Public and
Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of
Utah, and Certified Court Transcriber, residing in Salt
Lake City, Utah.
The transcript is a full and complete
transcription to the best of my ability of the
proceedings which were requested to be transcribed.
I further certify that I am not of kin or
otherwise associated with any of the parties to said
cause of action, and that I am not interested in the
event thereof.
Witness my hand at Salt Lake City, Utah, this
27th day of July, 1994.

Carolyn fcrickson, CSR

